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Evil and Compatibilism

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A legacy post originally published on FEBRUARY 8, 2015 at 11:33
🔗 Evil and Compatibilism by Mike Almeida


There is widespread belief that compatibilism + theism cannot offer a credible solution to the logical problem of evil. Why does anyone believe that? I think they’re reasoning this way: if compatibilism is true, then, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world. That’s of course true, and it entails that the free will defense fails. But then they reason, if, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world, then, necessarily, God does actualize a morally perfect world. It is then observed that, obviously, there is evil. So, compatibilism + theism is incoherent; it cannot solve the logical problem.

But the inference from, necessarily, God can actualize a morally perfect world to, necessarily, God does actualize a morally perfect world is invalid on the assumption of compatibilism (and, for that matter, libertarianism): that is, it is invalid on both Lewisian compatibilism and on any stronger compatibilism. In fact, theism + compatibilism, of either sort, is inconsistent with (M), which is the strong modal conclusion of the logical problem of evil. So, here are the choices: Either God cannot actualize a morally and naturally perfect world or the principle in (M) is false. But, surely, God can actualize a morally and naturally perfect world, I think is the right rejoinder.

  • M: Necessarily, God does not coexist with a single instance of moral or natural evil

Here is the argument for the inconsistency between theism + compatibilism and (M). Let w be a world in which God arranges history H and the laws of nature L so that it is causally determined that S does A at t. Let A be a morally significant action, such as keeping a promise. It is, we are assuming, all-in right to keep the promise and all-in wrong not to do so. Here is Lewisian compatibilism.

  • LC: S freely performed A at t only if (i) had S performed ~A at t, then it would have been the case that L is not the conjunction of laws of nature and (ii) S was able to perform ~A at t

We’ve assumed that God creates S in world w and determines S to do the morally right action A at t. But it follows from (LC) that S is free in w, in the Lewisian sense of being free, only if there is another world w’ in which S performs a moral evil ~A at t. In w’ S brings about the morally evil action of breaking a promise that S had an all-in obligation to keep. Here’s our conclusion.

  • C: If God creates S in w and determines S to go right, then if S is Lewis-free in w, then there is some possible world w’ in which (a) God exists and (b) there is moral evil

(C) is of course inconsistent with (M). So, if God is permitted to create morally perfect worlds in which everyone is causally determined to go right, and everyone is LC-free, then there must be a world in which God and moral evil coexist. But then, so much for (M). If God can create a morally and naturally perfect world in which every agent is Lewis-free, then (M) is false.

But what if we assume that agents are not Lewis free. Suppose we assume stronger compatibilism, (SC).

  • SC: S freely performed A at t only if (i) had S performed ~A at t, then it would have been the case that L is not the conjunction of laws of nature (ii’) S was unable to perform ~A at t.

Unlike (LC), (SC) does not assume that S was able to perform ~A at t. But (SC) holds that S is free anyway, despite being unable to act otherwise at t. But even on (SC) we can reach our conclusion in (C)! The conclusion in (C) follows from condition (i) alone of both (LC) and (SC). It does not matter whether we believe that, in w, S was able to perform ~A at t or not. All we need is that there is some possible world w’ in which S does perform ~A at t, and condition (i) ensures that there is such a world.

So, again, (C) is inconsistent with (M). If God is permitted to create morally perfect worlds in which everyone is causally determined to go right, and everyone is SC-free, then there must be a world in which God and moral evil coexist. So, we reach the conclusion that either God cannot actualize a morally and naturally perfect world—a world with free moral agents of some sort, compatibilist or otherwise—or the principle in (M) is false.

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