Philosophical Atheism vs. New Atheism
A defense of philosophical atheism (or whatever you want to call it) against new atheism (or whatever you want to call it) and my proposed truce.
A defense of philosophical atheism (or whatever you want to call it) against new atheism (or whatever you want to call it) and my proposed truce.
Jonathan Fuqua is assistant professor of philosophy at Conception Seminary College. Daniel Strudwick is professor of theology and the dean of the President’s Honors College at Quincy University. Their...
The problem of divine hiddenness is, in some reasonable sense, a “deeper” problem than the problem of evil. If God were vividly present to us, we could suffer almost anything—at least the kinds of things we find on this planet—without (evidential) doubt that God exists (and also with little emotional doubt). But, one clearly could have some (evidential) doubt that God existed, even if God were vividly present to them throughout the suffering.
Well, this is really a challenge for skeptics of a necessary being (a necessarily existing, causally powerful entity), but I wanted a catchy title, and as a matter of sociological observation, atheists are typically (though not always) skeptics of a necessary being. The challenge is this …
A while back, Edward Feser was asked when he would respond to the published criticisms of Joe Schmid. Feser replied that Joe is a sock account, with the implication that he did not need to respond to Joe. Well, you know what. I completely agree with Feser. Or do I?
For about 4 years now, I have grown into the habit of creating bibliographies for all my research interests. In the early days of Guarded Acumen,...
I maintain a bibliography of work on the problem of evil. I have shared it in a couple of other places and thought I’d share it...
I am very excited about the relaunching of Prosblogion. When I was a masters student, I would regularly read this blog. This was one of the...
I am starting to appreciate the confessional nature of arguments. Arguments are avenues for thinkers simply to confess to their dialectical partners what strikes them as convincing, true, or clear.
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