Suppose that I know that if I cause A, then either B or C will eventuate. Suppose that each of B and C furthers my plan, and neither of them furthers it better than the other. Then it does not seem that sovereignty would require me to know or decide prior to my decision to cause A which of B and C would eventuate.
A while back, Edward Feser was asked when he would respond to the published criticisms of Joe Schmid. Feser replied that Joe is a sock account, with the implication that he did not need to respond to Joe. Well, you know what. I completely agree with Feser. Or do I?
Given the assumption that God is timeless and free to create (and assuming, of course, that there is a God who has in fact freely created), we can, I think, derive a contradiction.
Here’s an easy-to-think-about argument against the infinite past. It bears some resemblance to arguments discussed in other recent threads. Though obviously inspired by the Grim Reaper discussion, it does not feature a series of fractions converging toward zero. I don’t think it’s a good argument, but I think there is a lesson to be learned.
In an another post, I gave a Grim Reaper based argument against an infinite past. Here I want to give two more arguments. Unlike the earlier argument, these two arguments are not going to be useful for arguing for the existence of God, since they make use of premises that the atheist is likely to deny.
An endless future is an actual infinite. Here are five arguments for the conclusion that an endless future is an actual infinite.
In this post I present the puzzle of psychophysical harmony. Dustin Crummett and I discuss the puzzle in a forthcoming OSPR paper (“Psychophysical Harmony: A New...
Let Egalitarian Universalism (EU) be the doctrine that God exists and gives everyone infinite happiness, and that the quantity of this happiness is the same for everyone. The traditional formulation of Pascal’s Wager obviously does not work in the case of the God of EU.
Over the years, I have published a wide network of arguments against the model of God known as classical theism. Some people find the arguments persuasive...
Ed Gracely in Analysis (1988) presented an instructive problem about wagering on heaven and hell. It tells us something interesting about Pascal’s Wager. Suppose you find yourself in hell and Satan himself has pity on you. He offers you this game of chance.
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